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Creative Commonsense?  An analysis of tensions between Copyright Law and Creative 
Commons 
Dr Nick Scharf1 
 
Legal context 
The Creative Commons (CC) movement operates as an important counterpoint to the 
expansionist copyright regime in the digital environment relating to recorded music by 
seeking to create a free and simple licensing mechanism that operates to construct a pool of 
content that creators can use without charge.  It creates an alternative model for creators to 
use in order to authorise the use/reuse of their work that circumvents the traditional market 
for copyright content as well as fostering its own CC-orientated intermediary outlets. 
 
Key points 
CC depends on copyright’s underlying proprietary system.  However, CC arguably constrains 
creators in terms of the content they can use to produce new works and does nothing to 
necessarily overcome the complexities posed by copyright infringement should a licence be 
breached.  Nonetheless, there are a number of intermediaries that provide CC-licenced 
content which suggests that the movement has traction.  Following an analysis of the CC-
orientated intermediaries in comparison with those engendered by copyright, it may be 
argued that the CC licensing system makes it difficult to transition from an amateur to a 
professional context.  Nonetheless, its symbolic value remains important. 
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Practical significance 
This piece will address the intermediary market structure for CC works as well as the 
potential difficulties commercial exploitation in order to evaluate whether or not it can be 
seen as a beneficial system for content creation and dissemination.  As is CC inherently 
limited by the intermediary structure built upon ‘free’ use, this may hinder a transition to 
revenue-generating creative activity. 
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1. Introduction 
From a creator and user perspective, the loss of faith in copyright law, and its enforcement 
has led to a significant reappraisal of the role of private law in the digital environment2.  One 
initiative which warrants consideration in this case, is Creative Commons (CC) which stands 
as a positive3 counterpoint, to the preceding expansionist nature of copyright law.  The 
movement was inspired by what was perceived as a threat to culture as a result of the 
influence of copyright law on creativity4.  As a counter-point to this, CC aims to ‘...build a 
more equitable, accessible, and innovative world’.5  Its premise is to relocate power from 
rightsholders to creators, who are afforded options to govern how their works may be used 
and re-used.  It also has the benefit of recognising that in the digital environment, the division 
between authors and users may be indistinct such that now users have the power and tools at 
their disposal to engage in creating their own content.  As such, this piece uses the collective 
term ‘creators’ to refer to both parties.   
It will explore the relationship between CC and copyright to demonstrate that 
although CC is dependent on the copyright system as a source of legal rights which can be 
forgone through the licensing options, its aim to create alternative source(s) of content 
circumvent the traditional market for copyright content.  As such, a divergence becomes 
evident between the markets for CC-licensed content and that of copyrighted content.  
Although the CC vision realises the full potential of the Internet for content sharing and re-
use, the commercial realities of the online intermediary landscape suggest that the movement 
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4 
may struggle to emerge beyond its relative self-established niche.  Whilst the alternative CC 
offers may be of primary appeal to many creators, the intermediary divergence between CC 
and copyright may therefore make it difficult for them to transition from an environment of 
sharing and re-use to one of commercial viability.   
The piece begins with a brief overview of the CC movement and available licences, 
before examining its relationship with copyright law; concluding that it arguably constrains 
creators in terms of the content they can use to produce new works and does nothing to 
necessarily overcome the complexities posed by copyright infringement should a licence be 
breached.  Despite this, there are a number of intermediaries that provide CC-licenced music 
which suggests that the movement has some traction.  However from looking at the market 
for such works, it will be argued that that it can never form a viable market alternative owing 
to inherent incompatibility between CC-licenced music the commercial revenue-driven 
market for music.  It will conclude that the CC licensing system makes it difficult to 
transition from an amateur to a professional context.  Whilst this may be a problem for some 
(although certainly not all), the music industry engendered by copyright is certainly not free 
from its own problems broadly caused by a lack of understanding and flexibility toward the 
very technology that CC recognises as being crucially important: the Internet.  Although there 
is nothing in copyright law that prevents a creator from exploiting their work and forgoing 
commercial remuneration, the fact that CC simply offers an alterative may perhaps be its 
strongest feature through allowing more formal and indeed symbolic, repositioning of power 
to creators themselves. 
 
2. Creative Commons 
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Creative Commons (CC) was founded in 2001 by James Boyle, Michael Carroll, Lawrence 
Lessig, Hal Abelson, Eric Saltzman and Eric Eldred6 who sought an alternative to the 
traditional copyright system.  The CC organisation is a non-profit, US-based establishment 
which operates as a licensing platform to promote the free use of creative works; both in 
terms of cost and freedom of use (to a degree)7, which recognises the value arising from the 
ability to engage and interact with a resource.  To an extent, the CC movement is to be 
admired as being a positive response to digital copyright infringement by removing 
restrictions on reproduction and distribution at the source, thus appreciating the normative 
expectations of users in relation to digital technology8.  In contrast, copyright policy in the 
area has largely been negative (or restrictive) in its response9 and practice.   
It assumes that it is possible to replace existing content production and distribution 
practices10 with the ultimate objective of positioning creative works as resources available to 
the public11 as well as ‘to promote alternatives to a one-way, passive consumption of 
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commercialized culture’.12  CC perceives the current copyright regime as a major obstacle for 
creative activity; something which has been more acutely felt with the development of the 
Internet and digital technologies.  These have created an environment which facilitates the 
consumption of content which in turn helps to inspire and generate new works; substantially 
reducing the cost of digital creations and potentially enabling greater participation by users in 
the creative process13.  Crucially, it has also enabled new forms of reuse which were not 
previously possible from the perspective that copyright law operates too well and is 
restrictive of such creative practices.  This is important as creative practice is generated by 
and through exposure to other content14, and the availability of content is crucial in 
maintaining a healthy creative environment15.  Therefore, CC aims to create and promote an 
alternative market for the production and consumption of digital content in line with norms 
and the possibilities afforded by this digital architecture.  The overall strategy of the 
movement can be described as twin-track: a legal component consisting of an author-centric 
licensing model; and, a symbolic component promoting the philosophies of sharing and 
contribution16.   
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Furthermore, it endeavours to lower the costs associated with copyright in terms of 
producing new works; the ‘permissions process’ for using copyrighted material can be 
cumbersome and expensive; therefore, CC has attempted to create a type of ‘modularised’ 
contract that creators can use to pre-authorise certain use(s) of their content17.  The fulcrum of 
this position is the creator’s control over content use through the CC licensing structure; 
conveying a formal expression of legal identity18 which allows them to extract agreements on 
reproduction19.  There are six licences to choose from and out of these, three permit 
commercial use (Attribution, Attribution-ShareAlike and Attribution-NoDerivs), whilst the 
remainder no not.  However, it does not appear that the term ‘commercial use’ is defined, 
although it may be presumed to be the opposite of CC’s definition of ‘NonCommercial’: 
‘primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or monetary 
compensation’.20  There is acknowledgement that no activity may be completely separated 
from commerciality, but that the primary nature of the reuse is what should be considered21.  
It is important to note that all the non-commercial licences contain a special provision for 
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20 Creative Commons, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ <https://creativecommons.org/faq/> accessed 1 November 
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21 Creative Commons, ‘NonCommercial interpretation’ 
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file-sharing (as this is deemed a commercial activity22), which is permitted, provided this is 
no monetary compensation23.   
The aim of these licences is (broadly) to authorise the use of copyrighted works for 
purposes that may otherwise constitute infringement under traditional copyright law24.  All 
the licences also terminate automatically if a work is used contrary to the specified licence 
terms25.  The component elements of the CC license ‘kit’, namely the ‘Deed’ and ‘Licence 
Code’ are intended to make the licence more accessible and understandable for users, as 
opposed to lawyers26 (on which particular emphasis was placed27).  These are accompanied 
by an icon or graphic designed to indicate the key feature of the particular licence.   
 
3. Creative Commons and Copyright 
                                                          
22 As the Court in Napster found, see A&M Records Inc. (and others) v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001), 912 
23 Creative Commons, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ <https://creativecommons.org/faq/> accessed 1 November 
2016 
24 S Dusollier, ‘The Master’s Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons v. Copyright’ (2006) 29 
Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 3 271-293, 271 
25 See the legal code s.6.a for all licences, available from <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/> accessed 1 
November 2016 
26 B Bloemsaat and P Kleve, ‘Creative Commons: A business model for products nobody wants to buy’ (2009) 
IRLCT 23(3) 237-249, 242 
27 J Coates, ‘Creative Commons – The Next Generation: Creative Commons licence use five years on’ (2007) 
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The introduction of the CC system reflects the changes in the concentration and subsequent 
decentralisation of information (and content) production28 that digital technology facilitates29.  
Nonetheless, the production and distribution of music in digital form still functions in 
accordance with the operation of rightsholders who have utilised copyright to preserve their 
pre-existing market operation.  CC could also be seen as a response, not just to digital 
technology, but also to the effect it has had on copyright law30 which has been expansively 
applied by rightsholders to secure their rights in the digital environment.   
Although CC has its own different rules31, copyright and CC can both operate jointly 
over music content and are therefore co-existent; copyright provides the underlying 
protection from which use can be administered via the CC licence.  The fact that CC operates 
with copyright law as its regulatory underpinning is perhaps its most workable aspect as it 
does not require any restructuring of copyright law itself and is unlikely to prejudice the 
commercial interests served by the existing regime32.  Nonetheless copyright is the 
inescapable legal interest that underpins the work itself. 
 
                                                          
28 Yochai Benkler‚ ‘The Commons as a Neglected factor of Information Policy‘ (26th Annual 
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29 L. Lessig, ‘The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World’  (2002, Vintage Books), p8. 
30 See generally, J Litman, ‘Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Image’ (1997) 22 U Dayton L Rev 587-
619 
31 LP Loren, ‘Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of Creative Commons 
Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright’ (2007) 14 Geo Mason L Rev 271-328, 275 
32 AK Goss, ‘Codifying a Commons: Copyright, Copyleft, and the Creative Commons Project’ (2007) 82 Chi-
Kent L Rev 963-996, 992 
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The CC licences seek to place such works in a ‘commons’33; a term that has come to 
be used increasingly over the last number of years to refer to wellsprings of creation that are 
outside of, or different from, the world of intellectual property34.  In essence, the idea of a 
‘commons’ refers to a situation where access to, and use of, a resource is organised on a non-
exclusionary basis.  Reduced to its conceptual minimum, it entails a situation where no 
specific individual or entity is recognised under the law as having a right to exclude others 
from access to and use of a given resource35.  Nonetheless, it appreciates the realities of copy-
based digital reproduction and ‘An information commons is possible because information is 
nonrival, and is an input and an output of its own production process’.36  Such a ‘commons’ 
could theoretically exist in the form of any available digital content, whether copyrighted or 
not.  A great deal of infringement occurs every day37 and therefore the notion of a separate 
‘commons’ does not apply well in the digital environment.  Given the opportunities digital 
technology has afforded, the commons here can theoretically be any content in digital form 
provided that it is available or accessible to users, regardless of copyright protection38.  It 
could be argued that because content is so easily available online, the boundaries between a 
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619-641, 621 
36 Yochai Benkler‚ ‘The Commons as a Neglected factor of Information Policy‘ (26th Annual 
Telecommunications Research Conference 1998) 21 <www.benkler.org/commons.pdf> accessed 2 November 
2016 
37 R Polk Wagner, ‘Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control’ (2003) 
Columbia Law review 103(4) 995-1034, 1010 
38 D Hunter FG Lastowka, ‘Amateur-To-Amateur’ (2004) 46 William and Mary Law Review 951-1030, 985 
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‘commons’ and protected content have blurred to the point of indivisibility as ‘All popular 
music ... essentially, if not legally, exists in a public domain’.39  Indeed, copyrighted music 
has a central place in genres such as the practice of ‘Plunderphonics’ which is ‘an umbrella 
term for any music made completely out of existing audio recordings, including copyrighted 
material, and then altered in some way to create a new composition’.40   
Although the CC and copyright systems are co-existent insofar as CC is entirely 
dependent on copyright, copyright treats almost all unauthorised use of content as 
infringement; save for those which may be covered under the fair dealing exceptions, which 
themselves have been described in the past as ‘rigid’41, or at least ‘outdated’42.  In 
comparison, CC pre-emptively delineates a sphere of use for the work according to the 
particular licence chosen.  Furthermore, as digital consumption is copy-based, resource 
depletion is not an issue and in this instance, it could be argued that CC unintentionally 
creates a degree of artificial scarcity within the realm of available content by exercising 
licensing control to delineate a self-prescribed commons, albeit it one which available for 
legal use.  This is because CC applies only to such self-prescribed works (as opposed to 
copyright’s automatic protection) and as such, it fragments available content into a commons 
with different usage restrictions and enforces its own barriers based on its own licence terms.  
Therefore it can be argued that the effect of CC licencing is to define and re-establish 
boundaries within the volume of content accessible, and useable, to a creator.   
                                                          
39 J Oswald, ‘Plunderphonics, or Audio Piracy as a Compositional Prerogative’ (Plunderphonics, 1985) 
available from: <www.plunderphonics.com/xhtml/xplunder.html> accessed 1 November 2016 
40 Ibid 
41 Pro Sieben media AG v Carleton UK Television Limited and Another [1988) FSR 43 (HC) 48 
42 I Hargreaves, Digital opportunity: a review of intellectual property and growth (Intellectual Property Office 
2011), 40-43 
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It is based on the premise of relocating power in the hands of the authors, but at the 
same time aims to be grounded in the expectations of users43 (in terms of allowing the re-use 
of content) even though most CC users have played no part in the development of the 
licences44.  As such, users of CC-licensed content are bound by one-way licence declaration 
on the part of the author and this has proved problematic in the past.  Licensing mechanisms 
also exist under copyright law that allow pre-existing copyrighted content to be utilised in the 
creation of new music and arguably a CC licence attached to a work introduces another 
potential variable to be taken into account45 over and above copyright and potential 
associated costs.  There is also no guarantee that CC-licensed content may be treated with any 
more (or less?) reverence than copyrighted content in respective the contexts of professional 
and amateur music production.  This can be seen in the Freesound46 project; a collaborative 
database of over fifty thousand47 CC licensed sounds48.  Content on Freesound consists of 
samples, drum loops, and other electronically produced sounds available for others to use49.  
Whilst it evidences the (worthwhile) ideological mind set of CC users who create music in 
                                                          
43 S Dusollier, ‘The Master’s Tools v. The Master’s House: Creative Commons v. Copyright’ (2006) 29 
Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 3 271-293, 288 
44 S Corbett, ‘Creative Commons Licences, the Copyright Regime and the Online Community: Is there a Fatal 
Disconnect?’ (2011) MLR 74(4) 503-531, 505 
45 B Bloemsaat and P Kleve, ‘Creative Commons: A business model for products nobody wants to buy’ (2009) 
IRLCT 23(3) 237-249, 246 
46 <www.freesound.org> accessed 1 November 2016 
47 ccMixter, ‘The Freesound project & ccMixter’ <http://ccmixter.org/freesound> accessed 1 November 2016 
48 Freesound, ‘About Freesound’ <www.freesound.org/help/about/> accessed 1 November 2016 
49 This has also been done commercially, with the dance producer Deadmau5 having released a sample CD-
ROM entitled ‘XFER’ (also the name of his record label) for producers.  See Loopmasters, ‘Deadmau5 XFER’ 
<www.loopmasters.com/product/details/236> accessed 16 March 2016  
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terms of creating content for use and re-use by others, CC does not take account of the 
differing attitudes individual creators may have towards these50.  For example, one Freesound 
user, Nic Stage, uploaded a sample that came to be used by UK dance group the Prodigy on 
their 2009 album ‘Invaders Must Die’ (a UK number one which sold over 1 million units 
worldwide) and which was featured on their single ‘Omen’51.  The sample itself was subject 
to an Attribution licence and had no non-commercial restriction.  However, problematically 
for Stage (and arguably more so for Creative Commons) he was not credited.  Although the 
situation was ultimately resolved, Nic Stage had the option to sue for copyright infringement 
and/or a breach of the CC licence. 
As already discussed, Copyright protection and the CC-licensing mechanism co-exist 
inasmuch that the sound recording receives automatic copyright protection upon fixation and 
the subsequent adoption of a CC-licence over it governing use/re-use.  Although CC licences 
are deemed to be legally enforceable52, as a matter of practicality, the unauthorised use of the 
CC-licensed work (in this instance by the Prodigy) could be treated as an infringement of 
copyright and not a breach of the licence, although both can arise in the same instance.  In 
addition, because a licence breach results in the termination of the CC licence itself, 
subsequent uses of the work are de facto copyright infringements.  Therefore, CC’s 
dependency on copyright means that in circumstances of alleged CC infringement, the 
                                                          
50 EE Johnson, ‘The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual Property Rights’ (2014) 94 Boston 
University Law Review 1935-1995, 1981 
51 Nic Stage, ‘Seems my sound was used without attribution…’ <www.freesound.org/forum/legal-help-and-
attribution-questions/4189/> accessed 1 November 2016  
52 Creative Commons, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ 
<https://wiki.creativecommons.org/index.php/Frequently_Asked_Questions#Are_Creative_Commons_licenses_
enforceable_in_a_court_of_law.3F> accessed 7 November 2016 
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perceived problems in copyright law that CC aims to overcome actually resurface.  Although 
little of the associated CC case law53 deals with copyright infringement directly, it has been 
relevant to some of the decisions54.  As mentioned above, the aims of the licences are to 
authorise the use of content where such use may otherwise infringe copyright law.  Therefore, 
a breach of the licence necessarily entails a breach of copyright as well and this being the 
case, recourse to copyright law may be the inevitable option for the creator.  Although CC 
appreciates the realities of the digital environment along with new and emerging forms of 
content use (and reuse), it ultimately fails to provide any alternative to copyright where use in 
contravention of the CC licence, i.e. unauthorised use, occurs.  In this particular instance 
however, the remedy sought by Cage was the appropriate attribution for himself and/or 
Freesound as per the licence, following dialogue with the band’s management.  His further 
correspondence on the matter is also reflective of the CC ideology and the Freesound project 
in particular, and crucially is indicative of the mindset of those who have adopted the 
mechanism.  
 
4. Creative Commons and Intermediaries 
CC has had a strong uptake in terms of online content providers as well as facilitating the 
development of new and CC-focussed intermediaries that focus on CC-licensed content 
provision.  Notwithstanding the issues discussed above, attention will now turn to these in 
order to assess their viability in facilitating a viable market for CC works.  In contrast to the 
joint-operation of CC and copyright over content, this section will argue that when it comes 
to the exploitation of CC content, the relationship between the two actually operate to 
                                                          
53 ‘Case Law’ <https://wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/Category:Case_Law> accessed 6 November 2016  
54 Curry v Audax 334492/KG 06-176 SR (District Court of Amsterdam, March 2006), Gerlach v DVU 16 O 
458/10 (District Court of Berlin, October 2010) and, Avi Re’uveni v Mapa TA 3560/09, 3561/09 (Israel, 2011) 
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segregate CC-licensed content in such a way so as to make a movement from ‘amateur’ to 
‘professional’ content creation difficult.  
As has been stated, CC aims to create an alternative market structure for creators 
participate in, as opposed to the ‘traditional’ (commercial) market engendered by copyright 
law and although CC also provides for non-commercial use, there has still been a substantial 
uptake of the licensing model.  Flickr and Wikipedia are two large undertakings who employ 
CC licences, with one billion CC-licensed images on Flickr55 and Wikipedia having over 5 
million articles in English56.  Data.gov.uk, which although governed by Crown Copyright, 
has a significant CC endorsement as the content’s licences are stated to be compatible with 
the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.057.  However, when one looks more closely at 
the materials that are available on these (and other) sites, they function as a pool of content or 
perhaps more accurately ‘resources’ i.e. reference materials/information that can be accessed 
and used.  This may explain why the sciences, libraries and academia have been most 
interested the licensing scheme58, as opposed to the content industries more widely.  Despite 
this, CC can operate as an incentive to engage in creative practice as well as organise the way 
                                                          
55 ‘Explore/Creative Commons’ <www.flickr.com/creativecommons/> accessed 2 November 2016 
56 ‘Content Licensing’ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia>, and, ‘English Wikipedia’ 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Wikipedia> accessed 6 November 2016.  Wikipedia adopted CC 
Attribution-ShareAlike licences in 2009. A full list of organisations that employ CC licences can be found on 
the ‘Content Directories’ page <http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Content_Directories> accessed 6 November 
2016 
57 Open Government Licence for public sector information <www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-
government-licence/version/3/> accessed 2 November 2016 
58 K Bowery, Law & Internet Cultures (Cambridge University Press 2005) 167 
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already-produced works are rationed and co-ordinated59; which in the online context is 
different from ‘traditional’ market-based content distribution governed by copyright.  Indeed, 
the goals of CC with its focus on sharing and reuse are different from the profit-orientated 
approach of the music industry; such that the two should not necessarily be regarded as being 
in competition with each other (nor should it be assumed that CC is trying to overtake, or 
replace, existing mechanisms of content creation).  Nonetheless, attention should be paid to 
outlets for such content in order to evaluate whether or not CC can provide an attractive 
alternative for creators. 
As user-generated content proliferates, the traditional boundary between popular 
culture and amateur productions is changing with today’s popular content sharing sites (such 
as YouTube) dominated by user-generated content60.  CC has fostered its own online 
intermediaries and under many circumstances, sharing can be more beneficial than market-
based distribution61.  Because they offer different possibilities from copyright, the CC licence 
options can act as a ‘disintermediating’ force because they enable end-to-end transactions of 
content.  However they can also act as a ‘reintermediating’ force by allowing new services 
and communities to form around such content62.  With the music industry focussing on fewer 
acts and taking on fewer risks63, there are opportunities for markets to develop and CC 
                                                          
59 WJ Gordon, ‘An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and 
Encouragement Theory’ (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 1343-1460, 1393, and see generally 1388-1393 
60 J Coates, ‘Creative Commons – The Next Generation: Creative Commons licence use five years on’ (2007) 
SCRIPTed 4(1), 83 
61 EE Johnson, ‘The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual Property Rights’ (2014) 94 Boston 
University Law Review 1935-1995, 1937 
62 MW Carroll, ‘Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries’ (2006) Mich St L Rev 45-65, 47 
63 A Harrison, Music: The Business (4th edn Virgin Books 2008) 49 
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licences may therefore have the possibility of enabling new intermediaries64 to grow .  One 
such intermediary is the Free Music Archive65 (FMA).  A search on the FMA music website 
first and foremost reveals range of musical genres and sub genres66, many of which would 
arguably not be classed as ‘mainstream’.  Instead, these can be seen as ‘niche’ genres which 
although they may not have universal appeal in themselves, may combine to form a sizeable 
portion a music market when taken together.  Another intermediary is Jamendo which 
provides a commercial outlet for CC-licenced music and one which is distinct from the 
copyright-based collecting agencies67.  Specifically, its Jamendo Licensing arm allows for the 
commercial exploitation for music for those artists registered on it through a range of licences 
for both individuals (priced at £3.99) and companies/legal entitles (ranging from £35 to 
£209)68.  Although artists using service are predominantly amateur, it appears that the prime 
motivator of both the amateur and professional artists is their adoption of the CC licences and 
                                                          
64 MW Carroll, ‘Creative Commons and the New Intermediaries’ (2006) Mich St L Rev 45-65, 49 
65 Free Music Archive <http://freemusicarchive.org/> accessed 2 November 2016 
66 Specifically: Blues, Classical, Country, Electronic, Experimental, Folk, Hip-Hop, Instrumental, International, 
Jazz, Novelty, Old-Time/historic, Pop, Rock, Soul-R&B and Spoken.  Each of these have their own sub-genres 
of which there is not enough space to list fully.  For example, the sub-genres of ‘Rock’ are: Garage, Surf, Goth, 
Indie-Rock, Industrial, Krautrock, Lo-Fi, Loud-Rock, Noise-Rock, Sludge, Metal, Black-Metal, Death-Metal, 
Grindcore, New Wave, Post-Rock, Space-Rock, Progressive, Psych-Rock, Punk, Electro-Punk, Hardcore, 
Thrash, No Wave, Post-Punk, Power Pop, Rock Opera and Shoegaze.   
Genres>Rock <http://freemusicarchive.org/genre/Rock/> accessed 2 November 2016 
67 Frequently Asked Questions, ‘What is free music?’ <www.jamendo.com/faq> accessed 2 November 2016 
68 Jamendo Licensing, ‘Amazing music. Incredible prices’ 
<https://licensing.jamendo.com/en/pricing?source=catalog_index> accessed 2 November 2016.  Jamendo also 
operate their own in-house credit system which may be purchased and used for various licensing bundles, see 
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its correspondence with the ethos of sharing69.  This is perhaps indicative of the fact that 
audience-building and sharing-based distribution is seen as preferable in the current digital 
landscape and should not be underestimated.  In such instances, CC can therefore enable the 
development untapped business models and markets70.  Nonetheless, a transition from 
recognition to commercial exploitation would be problematic as ‘Once an audience for an 
individual’s work develops, the question of compensation becomes more fraught’.71   
CC’s underlying element of gratuity poses clear problem when compared to the pre-
existing revenue-based market structure which copyright supports.  Recognised and 
centralised intermediaries are not necessarily the owners of the content, but through their 
market power they have been rendered ‘in charge’ of it.  As such, they may be regarded as 
‘stewards’ who provide access to, and streaming of, content to end-users and who are 
subsequently responsible for gleaning revenue for it.  For example the ‘Discover’ feature on 
Spotify algorithmically tailors music suggestions to the user’s ‘taste’, based on their listening 
habits72 and other commercial music intermediaries such as Tidal, Apple and Google offer 
similar services73.  Such intermediaries can also operate in a more ‘official’ context as 
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19 
aggregators and measurers of commercial success through the official charts system74.  
Streamed music has a role here too and is combined with physical sales and downloads to 
gauge a song’s popularity75.  However, this supports a much more revenue-orientated model 
of eligibility requiring a minimum pricing threshold; for example, digital tracks must have a 
minimum price of £0.40 GBP as ‘singles’ in order to be eligible76.  Similarly, one hundred 
streams of a song is equated to one download thereof77.  A revenue-based model is arguably 
necessary as music production can involve high initial costs78 and it can take up to 1 million 
GBP to launch a new music act79.  This has traditionally been mediated through capital80; 
implicating a broader economic structure at an ‘industrial’ level and which copyright 
provides for the music industry.  CC therefore assumes a limited view of creators as being 
those who may always permit the use/re-use of their work without potential remuneration; 
‘This ethos of sharing suggests that the economic model put in place by the Creative 
Commons licenses is one of gratuity’.81  Although it needs to be recognised that market 
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transactions are not efficient except for a minority of works with sufficiently high 
commercial value and that money is not an ideal motivator for creativity and innovation82, it 
can also be argued that very few artists utilising CC licensing will be able to sustain a living 
purely from their music83.  As a result, it is questionable whether creators would then have 
sufficient incentives to produce new works in a system is based on freedom and sharing. 
Owing to the joint operation of copyright and a CC licence over a piece of content, it 
theoretically means that there is nothing preventing the creator from exploiting their work 
(through copyright) outside of the CC system as the two are not mutually exclusive.  
However, should content be made freely available under CC, then direct commercial 
exploitation of the content through copyright becomes practically impossible; for example, a 
record label would be unlikely to be willing to licence and exploit something which is (or has 
been) already available online for free.  Alternative exploitation may be an option which may 
be realised through so-called ‘360 deals’ which, broadly speaking, give the rightsholder (i.e. 
the record label) a share of merchandising, ticket sales and many important aspects of an 
artist’s career84.   
CC is not necessarily a mechanism to facilitate profit directly from content, other than 
the ‘value’ that comes from attribution.  This serves as an important contrast to the 
‘traditional’ operation of the music industry which places the utmost importance on the 
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market and may arguably be modified to take account of their own interests85 (for example, 
the inclusion of music streaming in the charts, as mentioned above).  Attribution may be the 
most important thing above all else86 for creators as was the case with Nic Stage discussed 
above; in which case CC may be of benefit because ‘Copyright’s processes are relevant 
primarily to centralized copyright industries ... For amateurs, however, it isn’t clear that 
copyright law is very important at all’.87  However, such an ‘amateur’ context may be to the 
movement’s detriment as creators would be unlikely to devote themselves fully to creative 
practice if they cannot profit from the value that others place in their work88.  It needs to be 
borne in mind that although CC may make it difficult for creators to profit from their 
endeavours, this is not the goal of the movement; arguably, the real benefit of CC will be for 
creators who now have the ability to exploit their own works without, hopefully, being 
exploited themselves89.   
CC is inherently dependent on copyright in order for the licences to function and 
although it seeks to overcome the costs and burdens copyright may create when it comes to 
content production, there are still clear problems CC faces.  Although there are mechanisms 
to facilitate audience-building, the only mechanism by which to receive ‘compensation’ is the 
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pre-existing copyright market structure which CC is unable to incorporate itself in; leaving it 
vulnerable to misuse (including misuse by professionals).  This makes it difficult to emerge 
from its niche status despite the availability of CC-focussed intermediaries.  In contrast with 
the dual relationship copyright and CC has over content, at this juncture there is an 
insurmountable segregation between content protected by copyright and content specifically 
governed by a CC licence.  CC artificially constrains exploitation of the CC content through 
its own associated intermediaries; making both the creators and the intermediaries unable to 
engage with the copyright-driven commercial structure that is already in place.  This is 
perhaps a fundamental problem for the CC strategy; the fact that it operates primarily a ‘free’ 
basis suggests that a market could not develop for such content.  Although there are 
mechanisms to facilitate audience-building; the only mechanism by which to receive 
‘compensation’ is the pre-existing copyright structure which may be preferable90 as it can 
allow for increased exploitation which can subsequently increase value.  However, it does 
provide valuable recognition of the value of ‘free’ and the non-financial value, or recognition, 
that corresponds with this via attribution.   
 
5. Conclusion 
The CC strategy is not as revolutionary at it may perhaps first sound because it still 
effectively operates on the basis of copyright law, but this does not mean that the movement 
has no value.  It has the benefit of being designed with the realities of digital production and 
distribution in mind and can be considered a more proactive response to the problems of 
digital copyright law than the mere updating of copyright law.  Although CC may have 
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benefit in addressing user-norms engendered by digital technology, that is not to say it will 
provide a viable solution on its own.  CC resources and copyrighted resources are indistinct 
in their practical availability and by artificially aiming to create ‘scarcity’ through its 
licensing system, CC limits users (and itself) to a relatively narrow and niche body of 
content.  Theoretically, CC-licensed content is only available to serve as inputs for creative 
works.  As such, the self-imposed architecture of CC artificially narrows the available 
creative resources to other CC-licensed works.  Furthermore, it is questionable whether a 
viable market structure can develop in light of this because of the stipulated non-
commercial/free and predominantly amateur context in which it operates.  However, this does 
not jeopardise the movement’s validity as an alternative to the traditional copyright market 
structures and for many (as is the case with Jamendo, mentioned above), could be seen as its 
key feature. 
The CC movement recognises the opportunities afforded by digital technology for 
creation and dissemination of content.  It has also afforded the development of CC-themed 
digital intermediaries to facilitate the distribution of content.  Nonetheless, one must take a 
practical approach when looking at the markets for CC-licensed work.  Many of the large 
organisations that utilise the licensing system are not necessarily content distribution services, 
but ‘reference’ services.  As such, there is little (if any) revenue-generating market for such 
content.  It may also be suggested that artists adopting CC licensing, whilst making a noble 
statement against the constraints of copyright law, are missing the point.  The pure existence 
of such an enterprise demonstrates the potential scale and niche value the Internet is able to 
provide.  The Internet is able to sustain a virtually infinite demand curve and while this may 
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plateau towards the bottom of the arc, it may extend as far as there is content to support it91 
and copyright law can enable its exploitation. 
CC may facilitate the growth of intermediaries providing licensed content as 
(financial) copyright licensing costs would not be incurred.  This is no bad thing as providing 
an additional and alternative means of content dissemination92.  However, copyright and 
commerciality still have primacy in this respect regarding the music market.  It should be 
borne in mind that copyright also affords the option for gratuity; there is precedent in the 
music industry for the assumption that ‘giving something away’ can be beneficial, at least in 
terms of building a reputation for the artist93.  In this context, the controlling legalities of 
copyright can be forgone (and in some instances, actively discarded by the artist); and in such 
circumstances, a CC licence is unlikely to make much of a difference.  Furthermore, 
‘attribution’ is a necessary component in terms of building an audience, and this would still 
be the case without an attached CC licence.  Successful content exploitation it ultimately 
depends on building mutually beneficial relationships94 between artists and audience, which 
can be done just as easily through copyright and on the part of initiatives by the 
artists/creators themselves in presenting content to users and without such a formalised 
mechanism as CC licensing.  Digital technology also facilitates this further. 
 
                                                          
91 See generally C Anderson, The Longer Long Tail (Updated and Expanded Edition), (Random House 2009) 
92 D Hunter and FG Lastowka, ‘Amateur-To-Amateur’ (2004) 46 William and Mary Law Review 951-1030, 
1018 
93 See the examples of Prince, Wilco, OK, Radiohead (in a way), and Trent Reznor in G Kot, Ripped: How the 
Wired Generation Revolutionised Music’ (Scribner 2009), chapters 5, 8, 19 and 20 
94 MF Schultz, ‘Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to 
Obey Copyright Law’ (2006) 21 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 651-728, 657 
25 
Whilst it may be concluded that the CC licensing system is flawed, that is not to say it 
has no benefit whatsoever.  The dissemination of content under CC licences may be effective 
in providing creators with new opportunities95 (individually or via an intermediary) built on 
the value of attribution, although care should be exercised so as not to engender a ‘gift 
culture’96.  However, it is argued that CC existence as a practical, but also political97  
movement is its strongest virtue.  Copyright law is, and has been, subject to the lobbying 
interests of the content industries98; therefore, CC’s a symbolic value based around the 
philosophies of sharing and contribution operates as an important counter-point to the 
aggressive and restrictive strategies employed by the music industry. 
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